The Outside and Inside Views of Morality
From the outside, that is to say, out of human life, irrespective of human values, universally speaking, there is no apodictic, certain or even convincing reason to say anyone ought to truthfully (or even probably) do anything. There is no outer moral truth in a non-relativistic context. There is no argument or self-evident truth that means all humans of all times must do X. There are claims to that effect, but none that I have encountered which actually are universally true. These last statements are (I believe) true, but I do not contradict myself, for they are statements about morality and not moral commandments themselves.
One such statement (a theory really) about human morality that I believe is true that Nietzsche said is that (due to our psychologies being the way they are as empirically verifiable by scientific method) all humans view morality in terms of fairness. That which is fair is that which is morally justified. That which is not fair is wrong, or unjust. But of course the question is fair for whom? Are humans good judges of what is actually fair or not?
The Internal View of Morality
Are humans good judges of what is actually fair or not? No. Of course they are not, because humans also have something called "resentment". When "the world" in general is dealing someone a bad day (as if the world or fate actually exists and is personaifiable, which it is not), humans still feel entitled to yell at whomever is around them later on, when they feel they have "had enough" (usually they take it out on someone who is weaker than them - "will to power" in action even in "the weak"). All humans feel entitled to do things when they feel things have not been fair to them, irregardless of who (if anyone, usually no one) was unfair to them.
This plays a role in all vices. I have yet to read about or meet a human who had no vices and refused to indulge at least one, even of the greatest philosophers, who were supposed to be the most wise and virtuous, when they felt (consciously or sub-consciously) they were entitled an indulgence. This vice was usually a "know-it-all" pride - a vice I know well.
Nietzsche makes much of this (resentment) as he continues to describe his false dichotomatic theory of the genealogy of the weak morality and strong morality. It is a false dichotomy because of course every human has the simultaneously capacity for both the strong and weak view (in a decision or feeling in every moment, and in an aggregate behaviour pattern over the long term), otherwise the strong could never be made weak and vica versa. But whenever a young democrat reads Nietzsche, they immediately assume that the strong (them) is a different thing in kind from the weak (other people (who disagree with them and try to morally weaken them)). This may indeed be the case, but it is a difference in degree, and not in kind. And further, Nietzsche (of course) never argues (and actually argues against the possibility of) one side being justifiably better than the other.
Can such an argument be made? In the outer view, no. But in the inner view? It all depends to what does the term "morality" refer? If it refers to a universal apodictic commandment, then know. We can make universal claims about morality but no universal moral claims (that don't start with the hypothetical "If", for example, "If (the majority of) humans (and that thing does not substantially change over time) want to live in (the best possible kind of) happiness in this life, and supreme happiness in the life beyond (if such a thing exists)... etc". This cannot be a verifiable universal claim, for we can never know if all humans always at all times want to be as happy as possible (either individually or collectively)). Hence there are no possible moral claims with that are 100% certain. At least in the Outer moral view - where we are trying to find "clear and distinct" moral claims which we can know are 100% certain for all people of all time of all cultures, and are provable as such by some outer or universal proposition or truth (such as a Divinity for example).
But what if the word moral does not refer to such a concept? Or to out it another way, if we do not have a universal human extrinsic truth to base morality on, then why do we assume that's what we need? Why cannot we interpret our concept of morality based upon the human intrinsic notion of morality, for which we do have a knowable and verifiable base to start upon? I can know with indubitable certainty using the Intelligible Method (stemming from Descartes' cogito argument) that my psychology is as such that I view (and have a correspondent moral feeling) that morality is fairness, and I have direct unmediated access to my feelings when I feel that when someone or something is unfair to me that this is morally wrong and unjust (and I can extrapolate and guess that this is the same for other humans, although I'll never really know for sure of course). Why then do I say this is only my opinion and look for a certain outer truth to base morality upon when there is none, and no reason there should be, an no reason why I should need it?
To conclude this little rant. As I type this it seems more and more obvious to me that (and forgive me if everyone else realized this and I'm just now catching up with humanity) if human morality is only what is viewed in terms of fairness, and humans are the things which know things certainly or not, then the inner view of morality is the correct view - that it is a subjective view is irrelevant. And we can make certain modal (ie: loose statements which can change based on the situation) yet universal moral statements which are certain that do not require the "If" in front of them. For example, Plato's Good (the Republic) seems to work on this principle.
Ought we (truthfully) uphold the relations of the Good and seek to make ourselves excellent and virtuous (and moderate and temperate? In the outer view, no. This is a matter of opinion - if you want to be ultimately happy (perhaps) then perhaps you truthfully ought to do that for yourself. But in the inner view, I would need to discover what I personally view morality is (and that discovery will be in terms of fairness (generally speaking), as all humans view it) but then for a moral ethic for myself to follow, I need to determine what is fair for me to do? But a human determining what is truthfully fair for them to do is next to impossible, if possible at all. This quickly becomes "maybe I'm justified in doing whatever I want?"
It seems my inner and outer view have collapsed? Perhaps the hidden proposition I have been dancing around is: that which is personally felt to be morally justified is justified, in so far as it is justifiably true? This sounds a bit like Kant's moral imperative, with some Nietzsche (morally subjective) and Descartes (methodologically subjective) thrown in.
Disgusting. Are there no moral principle that a human can Know for themselves or others? So far, perhaps not for others, and perhaps for yourself if you are really true to your own vices and virtues.
So in the end all we have is the contract and Hobbes is right? Gross.
josh
---
I just realized a possible mistake I made in my own post, so I will comment upon it (not like any one else is reading this but me :)
When I said:
"But in the inner view, I would need to discover what I personally view morality is (and that discovery will be in terms of fairness (generally speaking), as all humans view it) but then for a moral ethic for myself to follow, I need to determine what is fair for me to do? But a human determining what is truthfully fair for them to do is next to impossible, if possible at all. This quickly becomes "maybe I'm justified in doing whatever I want?""
It seems to me that I did not think this through fully enough. If one reads Al Farabi (one of the most wise philosophers of all recorded history and sadly one of the least read) he implies in his "Attainment of Happiness" that the prudent thing and the good thing to do are always one in the same. Or in other words, there is no possibillity for the practical thing to do and the right thing to do to ever differ. He claims (rightfully IMO) that one who claims otherwise does not understand that the Good is both a) (Generally speaking) the state of causal relations between all living things and b) (particularly speaking) the objects or phenomena which one entity or group of entities value, inferring a moral view therefrom. In other words, the Good for Canada is money - we are an oligarchy hidden as a democracy. (t)The Good is to acquire wealth for all (and the ones very good at that have over time kept it to themselves and rule the others - ie: an oligarchy). Debate my view of Canada's political classification all you like, my point is that the (particular conception of) Good (or what is valued and sought after and all other rules of conduct for that regime follow from) is to acquire material resources.
The problem with that is oligarchs fail to see the full relations of the Good, and how they are all interconnected, with obvious reprucusions for their own souls, familly, regime and nature.
It is practical to get a job that will make you lots of money in their view. But, in the end, this does nothing (not necessarilly, and quite often not at all) to contribute to their ultimate Good (or Happiness, or harmonius relation to the whole, or Healthiness - more on this in the next)post), or the Good of anyone or anything except their material well being (and quite often they don't even get that right and get too fat or unhealthy).
My point is if the Good is the harmonius and excellent state of all things and TO all things, and if it is true this is the state which brings about the most happiness in this life, and the one beyond (if such a life exists), then the good thing to do and the practical thing to do are one in the same.
As such, when I said above I need to discover what is fair for me to do, the question is fair for whom? What ring of the Good am I looking at? My OWN ring? If morallity is rules of fairness that all humans believe in to some extent, then although there is no apodictic reason why I oght to care about anyone elses Good but my own (what is fair for thme) it DOES follow though that what is ultimately Fair for all (and for any) is what is Fair for all. And that can only be the Good, if the Good truly BE the Good (and make us all as healthy (physically and psychologically) and therefore happy as possible for as long as possible in our lives).
If this be true, then I have discovered (or finally figured out what Plato has been trying to tell me all along) - a completely humanistic system of morallity which does not depend on any dubious propositions, but rests upon humans as they are, humans as they are best, all other things as they are best (which can all be determined as by observation in practice - and must be modified in practice) and that all humans want this, if they all want fairness, which it appears they do. For ultimate fairness is the Good.
But perhaps this is too good to be true, and I can hear the Modern philosophers whispering in my ear. True Hobbes, not all humans, in fact seemingly few care about other people's fairness. They say "I want what is coming to ME, not anyone else". And true there is no apriori reason to say that anyone ought to care for anyone else. until one has dependents they must care for. It seems to be the height of hubris to accept a parent who had no care for their child, or more care for themselves than for their own offspring.
Alas, in this Ivory Tower in which I am trapped, the polemic continues.
One such statement (a theory really) about human morality that I believe is true that Nietzsche said is that (due to our psychologies being the way they are as empirically verifiable by scientific method) all humans view morality in terms of fairness. That which is fair is that which is morally justified. That which is not fair is wrong, or unjust. But of course the question is fair for whom? Are humans good judges of what is actually fair or not?
The Internal View of Morality
Are humans good judges of what is actually fair or not? No. Of course they are not, because humans also have something called "resentment". When "the world" in general is dealing someone a bad day (as if the world or fate actually exists and is personaifiable, which it is not), humans still feel entitled to yell at whomever is around them later on, when they feel they have "had enough" (usually they take it out on someone who is weaker than them - "will to power" in action even in "the weak"). All humans feel entitled to do things when they feel things have not been fair to them, irregardless of who (if anyone, usually no one) was unfair to them.
This plays a role in all vices. I have yet to read about or meet a human who had no vices and refused to indulge at least one, even of the greatest philosophers, who were supposed to be the most wise and virtuous, when they felt (consciously or sub-consciously) they were entitled an indulgence. This vice was usually a "know-it-all" pride - a vice I know well.
Nietzsche makes much of this (resentment) as he continues to describe his false dichotomatic theory of the genealogy of the weak morality and strong morality. It is a false dichotomy because of course every human has the simultaneously capacity for both the strong and weak view (in a decision or feeling in every moment, and in an aggregate behaviour pattern over the long term), otherwise the strong could never be made weak and vica versa. But whenever a young democrat reads Nietzsche, they immediately assume that the strong (them) is a different thing in kind from the weak (other people (who disagree with them and try to morally weaken them)). This may indeed be the case, but it is a difference in degree, and not in kind. And further, Nietzsche (of course) never argues (and actually argues against the possibility of) one side being justifiably better than the other.
Can such an argument be made? In the outer view, no. But in the inner view? It all depends to what does the term "morality" refer? If it refers to a universal apodictic commandment, then know. We can make universal claims about morality but no universal moral claims (that don't start with the hypothetical "If", for example, "If (the majority of) humans (and that thing does not substantially change over time) want to live in (the best possible kind of) happiness in this life, and supreme happiness in the life beyond (if such a thing exists)... etc". This cannot be a verifiable universal claim, for we can never know if all humans always at all times want to be as happy as possible (either individually or collectively)). Hence there are no possible moral claims with that are 100% certain. At least in the Outer moral view - where we are trying to find "clear and distinct" moral claims which we can know are 100% certain for all people of all time of all cultures, and are provable as such by some outer or universal proposition or truth (such as a Divinity for example).
But what if the word moral does not refer to such a concept? Or to out it another way, if we do not have a universal human extrinsic truth to base morality on, then why do we assume that's what we need? Why cannot we interpret our concept of morality based upon the human intrinsic notion of morality, for which we do have a knowable and verifiable base to start upon? I can know with indubitable certainty using the Intelligible Method (stemming from Descartes' cogito argument) that my psychology is as such that I view (and have a correspondent moral feeling) that morality is fairness, and I have direct unmediated access to my feelings when I feel that when someone or something is unfair to me that this is morally wrong and unjust (and I can extrapolate and guess that this is the same for other humans, although I'll never really know for sure of course). Why then do I say this is only my opinion and look for a certain outer truth to base morality upon when there is none, and no reason there should be, an no reason why I should need it?
To conclude this little rant. As I type this it seems more and more obvious to me that (and forgive me if everyone else realized this and I'm just now catching up with humanity) if human morality is only what is viewed in terms of fairness, and humans are the things which know things certainly or not, then the inner view of morality is the correct view - that it is a subjective view is irrelevant. And we can make certain modal (ie: loose statements which can change based on the situation) yet universal moral statements which are certain that do not require the "If" in front of them. For example, Plato's Good (the Republic) seems to work on this principle.
Ought we (truthfully) uphold the relations of the Good and seek to make ourselves excellent and virtuous (and moderate and temperate? In the outer view, no. This is a matter of opinion - if you want to be ultimately happy (perhaps) then perhaps you truthfully ought to do that for yourself. But in the inner view, I would need to discover what I personally view morality is (and that discovery will be in terms of fairness (generally speaking), as all humans view it) but then for a moral ethic for myself to follow, I need to determine what is fair for me to do? But a human determining what is truthfully fair for them to do is next to impossible, if possible at all. This quickly becomes "maybe I'm justified in doing whatever I want?"
It seems my inner and outer view have collapsed? Perhaps the hidden proposition I have been dancing around is: that which is personally felt to be morally justified is justified, in so far as it is justifiably true? This sounds a bit like Kant's moral imperative, with some Nietzsche (morally subjective) and Descartes (methodologically subjective) thrown in.
Disgusting. Are there no moral principle that a human can Know for themselves or others? So far, perhaps not for others, and perhaps for yourself if you are really true to your own vices and virtues.
So in the end all we have is the contract and Hobbes is right? Gross.
josh
---
I just realized a possible mistake I made in my own post, so I will comment upon it (not like any one else is reading this but me :)
When I said:
"But in the inner view, I would need to discover what I personally view morality is (and that discovery will be in terms of fairness (generally speaking), as all humans view it) but then for a moral ethic for myself to follow, I need to determine what is fair for me to do? But a human determining what is truthfully fair for them to do is next to impossible, if possible at all. This quickly becomes "maybe I'm justified in doing whatever I want?""
It seems to me that I did not think this through fully enough. If one reads Al Farabi (one of the most wise philosophers of all recorded history and sadly one of the least read) he implies in his "Attainment of Happiness" that the prudent thing and the good thing to do are always one in the same. Or in other words, there is no possibillity for the practical thing to do and the right thing to do to ever differ. He claims (rightfully IMO) that one who claims otherwise does not understand that the Good is both a) (Generally speaking) the state of causal relations between all living things and b) (particularly speaking) the objects or phenomena which one entity or group of entities value, inferring a moral view therefrom. In other words, the Good for Canada is money - we are an oligarchy hidden as a democracy. (t)The Good is to acquire wealth for all (and the ones very good at that have over time kept it to themselves and rule the others - ie: an oligarchy). Debate my view of Canada's political classification all you like, my point is that the (particular conception of) Good (or what is valued and sought after and all other rules of conduct for that regime follow from) is to acquire material resources.
The problem with that is oligarchs fail to see the full relations of the Good, and how they are all interconnected, with obvious reprucusions for their own souls, familly, regime and nature.
It is practical to get a job that will make you lots of money in their view. But, in the end, this does nothing (not necessarilly, and quite often not at all) to contribute to their ultimate Good (or Happiness, or harmonius relation to the whole, or Healthiness - more on this in the next)post), or the Good of anyone or anything except their material well being (and quite often they don't even get that right and get too fat or unhealthy).
My point is if the Good is the harmonius and excellent state of all things and TO all things, and if it is true this is the state which brings about the most happiness in this life, and the one beyond (if such a life exists), then the good thing to do and the practical thing to do are one in the same.
As such, when I said above I need to discover what is fair for me to do, the question is fair for whom? What ring of the Good am I looking at? My OWN ring? If morallity is rules of fairness that all humans believe in to some extent, then although there is no apodictic reason why I oght to care about anyone elses Good but my own (what is fair for thme) it DOES follow though that what is ultimately Fair for all (and for any) is what is Fair for all. And that can only be the Good, if the Good truly BE the Good (and make us all as healthy (physically and psychologically) and therefore happy as possible for as long as possible in our lives).
If this be true, then I have discovered (or finally figured out what Plato has been trying to tell me all along) - a completely humanistic system of morallity which does not depend on any dubious propositions, but rests upon humans as they are, humans as they are best, all other things as they are best (which can all be determined as by observation in practice - and must be modified in practice) and that all humans want this, if they all want fairness, which it appears they do. For ultimate fairness is the Good.
But perhaps this is too good to be true, and I can hear the Modern philosophers whispering in my ear. True Hobbes, not all humans, in fact seemingly few care about other people's fairness. They say "I want what is coming to ME, not anyone else". And true there is no apriori reason to say that anyone ought to care for anyone else. until one has dependents they must care for. It seems to be the height of hubris to accept a parent who had no care for their child, or more care for themselves than for their own offspring.
Alas, in this Ivory Tower in which I am trapped, the polemic continues.
posted by JB @ 9:49 AM
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